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<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

This document presents the results for Plan Colombia (PC) relative to each one of its fundamental goals: to fight against the world drug problem, organized crime, and the violence they generate, to revitalize the economy and society, to strengthen democratic institutions, and to make progress in peace negotiations in Colombia.

The report is necessary to mark the progress made thanks to joint efforts by the national government and the government of the United States of America.

From the year the Plan was first executed, 1999, until now, significant changes have been wrought in Colombia. They include a reduction in violence and a recovery of security that are reflected in a decrease in the number of homicides, kidnappings, and massacres. Territorial control has increased thanks to the presence of the Public Security Forces in all the urban centers of Colombian municipalities. Illicit cultivation of coca has been reduced relative to its growth in the decade of the nineties, due to the efforts made in manual eradication and air fumigation, interdiction, and extradition. The economy has grown at close to 5% annually. And progress has been made in improving and increasing access to the justice system, and in the protection and promotion of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.

The document is divided into four sections, first of them is this introductions. The second explains what PC is, defines the objectives of the bilateral cooperation’s comprehensive strategy, and breaks down the amounts of the financing between the contributions from the United States government and the contributions from the general budget of the nation.

1 The Public Security Forces include the Armed Forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy) and the Colombian Police.
2 The official statistics on illicit crops in Colombia are provided by the SIMCI project, “Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring System”, an organization under the auspices of the United Nations, UN, which has been monitoring crops since 1999, with annual surveys that are published in the month of June.
The third section points out the results and achievements of PC from 1999 to 2005 in its four components:

i. The fight against illegal drugs and organized crime
ii. Economic and social revitalization
iii. Strengthening democratic institutions
iv. Progress in the Colombian peace process

Finally, the fourth section presents conclusions, which have the purpose of connecting the results of the first phase of Plan Colombia with a second phase whose formulation is described in another document. Given the evident success of the first phase, the document proposes further fortification of the components developed so far.

II. WHAT IS PLAN COLOMBIA? (OBJECTIVES AND FINANCING)

PC is a comprehensive strategy for bilateral cooperation, whose overall goal is to fight against illegal drugs and organized crime, thus contributing to economic revitalization, and to obtaining peace in Colombia. At the same time it strengthens control over the supply of illegal drugs in North American streets. The agreement is based on the principle of shared responsibility, which recognizes that the world drug problem is a responsibility held in common and shared by the entire international community. An integral and balanced vision is demanded in order to confront the demand and supply of illegal drugs.

Moreover, PC seeks to strengthen the Colombian State and Colombian society in order to defeat the narco-terrorist threat, in a context of strengthening Democracy and Human Rights. At the same time PC seeks to improve the social and economic conditions of the most vulnerable groups in the population by offering them other alternatives than producing illegal drugs (See Table 1).
Table 1. PC objectives by component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fight against the world drug problem and organized crime</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>2,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and social revitalization</td>
<td>3,378</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td>6,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening democratic institutions</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
<td>6,950</td>
<td>3,782</td>
<td>10,732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DNP - DJS

The total investment in PC execution was US$ 10,732 million. Of those resources, US$ 6,950 million (64.8%) came from Colombian fiscal efforts, and US$ 3,782 million (35.2%) from contributions from the United States government (Table 2).

Table 2. PC resources executed (Figures in millions of dollars), 1999-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of Democratic Institutions</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>2,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against illegal drugs and organized crime</td>
<td>3,378</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td>6,165</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic and social revitalization</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,950</td>
<td>3,782</td>
<td>10,732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Ministry of Defense (MDN) and Social Action. Calculations: DJS - DNP.

PC resources executed, by component, were as follows: 26.57% for strengthening democratic institutions, 57.45% for the fight against illegal drugs and organized crime,
and 15.98% for economic and social revitalization. Within the components of strengthening democratic institutions and economic and social revitalization there are several programs specifically directed toward progress in Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

III. ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS OF PLAN COLOMBIA

A. Fight against the world drug problem

With the goal of reducing the cultivation, production, and traffic of illegal drugs, as well as dismantling the infrastructure that supports it and curbing the violence generated by organized crime, the national government began an important process to strengthen the Armed Forces and the National Police. This process modernized, restructured, increased the professionalism, and provided HR training for those Forces.

Modernizing the Armed Forces has produced a notable improvement in air capacity to provide air fire support in combat, to accompany eradication operations, and to move provisions and personnel to and from areas where access by land or river is very difficult. The modernization has also led to improved capacity to carry out night operations, a growing implementation of technical intelligence in the operations of the public security forces, and the unification of communication systems.

As far as the restructuring, the introduction of the joint operation doctrine has led to specialization and complementation of the skills of each Force. This specialization is fundamental to effective control of territory and the fight against drugs and associated violence. The efforts in this aspect can be seen in the creation of the Caribbean Joint Command and the Southern Joint Task Force. Likewise, mobility and an offensive posture have become key factors in the doctrine of the public security forces with the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA from the initials in Spanish), twelve Mobile Brigades, and more than fourteen Mobile Carabineers Squads.

The professionalization of the Army soldiers and Navy personnel has also led to a change in the composition of the standing force, increasing the proportion of combatant
soldiers. Thus, the number of drafted soldiers was reduced by 40,312 between 1998 and July 31, 2005, and the number of professional soldiers was increased, going from 22,459 to 79,176 in the same period.

Eradication

Modernization, restructuring, and professionalization, combined with the emphasis given to the tasks of eradication, interdiction, and extradition generated an important change in the behavior of coca crops and coca trafficking in the country. In the nineties, and particularly after 1993, Colombia had a growing trend in the number of hectares planted with coca. This trend accelerated after 1995, and became most critical from 1998 to 1999, when the cultivations went from 101,800 to 160,119 hectares, increasing by 57% (Graph 1). This behavior, of course, led to a continuous increase in coca crops. Just two years of Plan Colombia, however, managed to reverse this growth trend.

Graph 1. Behavior of the number of hectares planted with coca in Colombia, 1990 - 2005

Source: SIMCI, Colombian Police - Anti-Narcotic Department, UNODC and the United States of America Department of State.
Crops thus went down from 163,290 hectares in 2000 to 85,750 in 2005, representing a decrease of 47.5%. In particular, the active eradication campaign led to sprinkle, in 1999 - 2005, 732.125 hectares and to eradicated manually other 61.614 hectares\(^3\) (Graph 2). In this sense, it is important to emphasize that the 46.4% decrease in the number of hectares planted with coca was achieved using Plan Colombia Phase I resources.

**Graph 2. Sprinkled and manual eradicated hectares of coca, 1994 - 2005**

![Graph showing sprinkled and manual eradicated hectares of coca, 1994 - 2005](image)

Source: Colombian Drugs Observatory and Narcotics National Direction

The combined strategies of Plan Colombia and the Democratic Security Policy have also decimated the capacity of the Illegal Armed Groups (GAML) to upset the public order

\(^3\) To get an idea of the productive capacity of these hectares, if production were to begin simultaneously on all of them, they could generate a total of 4,408 tons of cocaine in one year. At international market prices, that amount would have an estimated value of US$ 104,812 million (At wholesale prices in the United States). Source: World Drug Report, 2004. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime- UNODC and Anti-narcotics Police).
and affect the well being of Colombian society. According to preliminary estimates\(^4\), the amount of resources from drug trafficking activities that were kept from reaching the coffers of the terrorist groups in 2004 was US$ 436 million.

**Interdiction**

Another field in which great advances have been made thanks to the combination of Plan Colombia and the Democratic Security Policy is in interdiction. From 1999 to 2005, a total of 716 tons of cocaine were seized in Colombia at a value of US$ 17,294 million. That is equivalent to the amount of cocaine consumed in the United States in two years. In the same period, a total of 185 airplanes, 8,214 vehicles, and 1,799 ships were also confiscated, and 9,231 laboratories were destroyed (Graphs 3 and 4).

**Graph 3. Cocaine seizures in Colombia, 1999 - 2005 (kilograms)**

![Graph 3. Cocaine seizures in Colombia, 1999 - 2005 (kilograms)](image)

**Source:** SIDCO - DNE

\(^4\) Calculations by DJS - DNP
In the framework of strengthening the interdiction programs, three Brigades were created in the Colombian Army to fight drug trafficking, and four mobile eradication bases and two interdiction companies (Jungle) were created in the National Police. Likewise, with resources from the United States government, a process of upgrading and refurbishing fixed and rotary wing aircraft was begun in the public security forces. It was complemented by the loan of equipment in order to meet the objectives established for the fight against drug trafficking.

As of 2004, air interdiction efforts were strengthened by the renewal of the Bilateral Program for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances with the government of the United States of America. Thanks to that program, the capacity of the Colombian Air Force (FAC) to control the air space and prevent its use for illegal activities has been increased.

Source: SIDCO - DNE
As far as maritime interdiction, cooperation in the framework of Plan Colombia has strengthened Coastguard Corp capabilities on inland waters and in its ocean territory. It has also strengthened the ground units of the naval components that operate in the exclusive economic zone, particularly in the areas where routes converge for trafficking drugs, arms, munitions, and explosives, liquid and solid chemical precursors, and contraband. Increased control of Colombian rivers via river interdiction has been guaranteed. Those rivers are often used by drug trafficking organizations to transport inputs and drugs.

It must be emphasized that the success of the eradication and interdiction programs has had a concrete impact on breaking the growth trend in coca cultivation in Colombia, and has also been able to put the drug-terrorist organizations on the defensive.

**Extradition**

Supported by PC, the Colombian government has recovered control of national territory and has generated efficient mechanisms for defending national sovereignty. Significant progress has also been made in the fight against terrorist organizations and against their participation in the different links in the chain of the drug trafficking business.

In addition, under the premise that the world drug problem has transnational characteristics, the Colombian government has authorized the extradition of a total of 428 people from 1999 to 2005, as can be seen in Graph 5.
**Efforts in the fight against the terrorist threat**

In the fight against the terrorist threat, considerable efforts have been made in the military arena. Thus, the number of personnel in the public security forces went from 249,833 in 1998, to 380,069 in 2005, representing an increase of 52.1%. The efforts are evident in regional comparisons. As can be seen in Chart 6, from 1990 to 2003, Colombia’s standing force grew, while the numbers for other countries in the region that have traditionally had a large standing force, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Peru, were stable.
Likewise, in expenditures on defense and security as a percentage of GDP, there have been significant increases. As shown in Graph 7, expenditures went from 3.5% in 1999 to 4.6% in 2005.
As can be seen in Table 3, the main indicators for violence in Colombia have shown significant improvement in the period PC has been executed. The 33.3% decrease in the national homicide rate, the 85.4% decrease in the number of kidnappings, and the 71.4% fall in the number of massacres are all worth emphasizing.

Table 3. Results for the main indicators for violence in Colombia, 1999 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of kidnappings for extortion</td>
<td>2,587</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of massacres</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of displaced persons</td>
<td>31,635</td>
<td>331,982</td>
<td>375,758</td>
<td>424,927</td>
<td>221,413</td>
<td>162,936</td>
<td>169,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of members of illegal armed groups captured</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>5,119</td>
<td>10,133</td>
<td>11,102</td>
<td>8,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of casualties in illegal armed groups</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>2,265</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>2,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of attacks on infrastructure</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N/R: No Record
PC support to the Armed Forces and the Police has been a crucial element in breaking the perverse tie between the growth and production of illegal drugs and the activities of the criminal and terrorist groups throughout Colombian territory and on its borders.

These efforts, in addition to the positive results in the area of demobilization (Graph 8), have led to a notable decrease in the number of members in the illegal armed groups. So, while in 1999 the number of individual demobilized people was 107, in 2004, year of the highest report in the analyzed period, individual demobilized arrived to 2,967 people. On the other hand, collective demobilization, reported since 2003, got the highest report on 2006, when were reported 17,574 collective demobilized.

Graph 8. Number of collective and individual demobilizations, 1999 - 2006

**Mobility of the Armed Forces and Police**

Because of the characteristics of Colombian territory, which includes more than 1,141,000 square kilometers of abrupt topography, the Armed Forces and the Police require equipment that will allow them to fight against drugs and terrorism in the furthest corners of the nation with agility and efficiency. They need uniformed and support personnel who are trained to face this challenge.

Therefore, PC enabled the acquisition and modernization of equipment and the creation of the Logistical Synergy System (SILOG from the initials in Spanish), thus increasing capabilities for mobility, support, and logistics in the Armed Forces. In addition, doctrine was updated, with the introduction of the concept of joint operations, and the professionalization of the standing force was increased.

In the area of mobility, the forces’ air components have been strengthened with the cooperation of the United States government. Mobility in particular has been strengthened, using fixed and rotary wing aircraft, for personnel transport missions (moving personnel between operation zones and air assault), and cargo (supplies for the logistics chain in remote places or places with difficult access, and the supply of war material to operation zones). As seen in Table 4 and Graph 9, the cooperation from the government of the United States has been basic to this aspect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Rotary Wing Aircraft</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Counter-narcotic Police</th>
<th>National Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liaison and transportation</td>
<td>UH-1N</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BELL 212</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BELL 412</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BELL 206 RANGER</td>
<td>4 (a)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HUEY II</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>UH-60 BLACK HAWK</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td></td>
<td>HUGHES</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>KMAX</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Aircraft used in the fight against illegal drugs and organized crime
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Fixed Wing Aircraft</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Counter-narcotic Police</th>
<th>National Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>AC47 T</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>A-37</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OV-10</td>
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<td>Fumigation</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>SUPER KING-300</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-237</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DC-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>DHC6-300 TWIN OTTER</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-99</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-208 CARAVAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-206G</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAIRCHILD</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United States Embassy, Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), National Police, and MDN.

Notes
1 FAC aircraft that were upgraded. Two were retired as per Technical Bulletin 540 and one crashed.
2 FAC aircraft that were modernized.
3 One aircraft was donated and the other four FAC-owned aircraft were upgraded.
4 Aircraft owned by the Navy that were upgraded. Given over to Navy custody by the DNE.
5 NAS Program.
6 Foreign Military Financing Program FMF-P.
The increase in the air tactical operations capability of the public security forces, derived from the greater number of aircraft, is reflected in a significant growth in the number of flight hours logged for the stages of organization, deployment, use of the capabilities of the public security forces, and support to those activities. The greater availability of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft for liaison, transportation, cargo, and intelligence missions has favored organization, deployment, and support in the different areas of operation for the Army, the Air Force, and the Police. The support from the fixed wing aircraft on air missions for fumigation, combat, fire support, and intelligence, using mainly Air Force and Police capabilities, has been key to the fight against drug trafficking, organized crime, and in favor of territorial control.

North American support for increased numbers of aircraft has been accompanied by a significant advance in Public Security Force personnel skills for operating and carrying out first, second, and third level repairs on the UH - 60, UH - 1N and Huey - II helicopters. These helicopters are used by the Army Aviation Brigade and the Aviation
Area of the Anti-narcotic Police in the struggle against drugs and terrorism. The progress has occurred largely within the framework of the PC Helicopter Program, under which the United States trained, retrained, and certified a yearly average of thirty (30) crew members and forty (40) Colombian mechanics.

From the start of the program in 2003 to January 1, 2006, 186 pilots and 218 mechanics have been trained in the Aviation Brigade, of which 64% and 69%, respectively, have now been certified for the operation and repair of rotary-wing aircraft. Strengthening this program will guarantee closure of the gap between the growing need for pilots and mechanics and the number of Colombian personnel in the Public Security Forces that are trained in those functions.

In Graph 10, the evolution in flight hours for the aircraft used by the National Police and the Army Aviation Brigade can be observed. From 2000 to 2001, flight hours increased by 17,400 hours\(^5\), reaching a total of 33,682 hours in the year 2001, double the hours flown in 2000. This variation is in consequence of the commencement of Army support for Police spraying missions.

Between 2001 and 2004, Army and Police units flew a total of 160,000 hours in operations to eradicate illicit crops. This represents an annual average of 32,000 hours\(^6\). The flight hours for the fixed wing aircraft used by the National Police from 1999 to 2004 add up to a total of 53,000 flight hours dedicated to anti-narcotic operations. The Colombian Air Force flew a total of 74,000 hours in air interdiction operations, including everything from air reconnaissance to aircraft interception.

\(^5\) For the calculation, only flight hours for operations against drug trafficking were included.
\(^6\) The statistics do not include training flight hours.
PC resources have facilitated air support to ground units. This aspect takes on special importance for the morale and well being of the troops, given the remoteness of the areas of combat and the limited resources of the Forces for developing air support operations in general.

In the same way, the resources assigned to the maintenance units have made logistical resources more available to the troops. On the one hand, the logistical resources facilitate their performance in the jungle areas in which they carry out the majority of their operations. And on the other hand, they constitute a vital factor in getting basic provisions to the personnel in those areas.

The cooperation has also facilitated the commencement of other processes to strengthen the Armed Forces. Relative to health, combat medical support is one of the operational supports most appreciated by the units. In this sense, the Armed Forces
General Command formed three Air-transported Groups for Advanced Trauma Support (GATRA from the initials in Spanish), to offer immediate support to those wounded in combat, cutting the time needed to begin resuscitation and advanced attention to control critical injuries, and to stabilize and evacuate patients\(^7\).

**Infrastructure support**

In the area of infrastructure, support has been provided for building troop lodging and training installations located in Apiay (Battalions of the Seventh Brigade), Tolemaida\(^8\), Putumayo (Battalions of the Twenty-seventh Brigade) and in the Army Anti-narcotics Brigade in Larandia. The upgrading of runways and taxiing zones is another notable example of the cooperation received in the framework of PC with the goal of counteracting the narco-terrorist threat in the eastern mountain range.

The efforts made in the areas of modernization, restructuring, and professionalization of the Public Security Forces, combined with the strategies of eradication (both aerial and manual), interdiction, and extradition, have given the state better control over territory and produced a reversal in the growth trend in the cultivation of illegal drugs and in the violence financed by that industry.

**B. Economic and social revitalization**

The advances made in security have fortified society and the economy. Between 2003 and 2005, in the economic arena, Colombia reached a growth rate of over 4%, the highest in the last eight years (See Graph 11).

---

\(^7\) Source: General Department of Military Health. 2004.

\(^8\) This Base serves as the command center for the deployment of various Mobile Brigades and as a unit for education, training, and retraining in different specialties and skills. It also constitutes an essential point for support and service to the different activities carried out by the public security forces in the national territory.
The inflation rate was 4.85% in 2005, the lowest in the last decade. Similar achievements have been obtained in the unemployment rate, which went from 13% in December 2004 to 11.8% in December 2005 (See Graph 12).
Based on these figures, Colombian economic perspectives are looking positive in the medium run. In fact, annual growth rates of 6% are projected, especially if the national government can maintain its policy of fiscal austerity and implement reforms to the pension system and the General Participation System.

*Tariff preferences as an engine for growth and economic development*

And there are hopes for even greater growth as a result of the expansion of trade opportunities with the United States and with other countries in the framework of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

*Social Reactivation*

Relative to social revitalization, a Social Support Network (RAS from the initials in Spanish) was designed and set up to mitigate the impact of the economic recession on
the poorest sectors of the population. That network, together with the extension and expansion of the benefits granted by the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) by means of the ATPDEA in 2002, are the main achievements of PC in this area.

When the ATPDEA entered into effect, Colombian exports to the United States were able to recover the dynamism they had lost during 2001, to such a degree that during the 2002 - 2005 period exports to that country in FOB millions of dollars increased by 64% (See Graph 13).

**Graph 13. Exports to the United States in FOB Millions of Dollars, 1999 -2005**

Source: DANE. Calculations DNP - DJS

PC also helped to implement a Social Support Network, based on three programs: Families in Action, Employment in Action, and Youth in Action. The Families in Action program has given out subsidies for education and nutrition to more than 500 thousand families, benefiting more than 1 million children in 32 Departments of the country (See Graph 14).
The Employment in Action Program financed 3,724 projects to generate temporary employment through infrastructure works, with the investment shown in Table 5. It benefited more than 170 thousand people through an investment of close to US$ 95 million over the 2000 - 2004 period. Through the Youth in Action Program, an US$ 74 million investment in training courses benefited 94,649 young people between the ages of 18 and 25.
Table 5. Investments in Employment in Action Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invitation</th>
<th>Hiring Organizations</th>
<th>Hiring Courses</th>
<th>Young people</th>
<th>Resources (thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>24,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>34,183</td>
<td>65,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>19,151</td>
<td>36,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>26,615</td>
<td>51,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>94,649</td>
<td>177,619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Accion Social

The Family Forest Guard Program has provided legitimate options for income and employment for 33,594 families (See Graph 15) and more than 40,000 families have benefited from productive projects that have kept 55,927 hectares free from illicit crops.

Graph 15. Families benefiting from payments through the Family Forest Guard Program (accumulated for the year), 2003 - 2005

Source: DEPP - DNP
In the framework of the National Development Plan 2002-2006, “Toward a Community State”, the coverage of social programs has been expanded using seven tools for equality, in order to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups in the Colombian population. As a result, and as reflected in Graph 16, the majority of the social indicators in Colombia have shown significant improvement.

![Graph 16. Behavior of social indicators in Colombia, 1999 - 2005](image)

Source: National Ministry of Education, DEPP- DNP

All of the achievements mentioned were made viable thanks to Plan Colombia resources, guidelines, and projects. Its contribution counteracted critical phenomena that were affecting the normal performance of the Colombian economy and Colombian society.

**Attention to the Displaced Population**

It would be relevant to point out here the efforts made by the national government relative to the protection of HR and IHL. An example of this is found in the attention given to the population displaced by armed violence. In effect, and according to the
information supplied by the Sole Registration System (SUR) at Social Action, an accumulated total of 1,768,810 people were displaced during the 1997 - 2005 period.

The most critical time for this problem was between 2000 and 2002. Sixty-four percent of the total displacements that occurred in the period analyzed, took place in that lapse of time, and affected 900 municipalities in the country. In contrast with that dynamic, displacement fell 60% between 2002 and 2005, as can be seen in Graph 17.

**Graph 17. Number of people displaced in Colombia**

Source: Social Action.

During the 1995 - 2004 period, the Colombian State invested close to US$ 431 million (in 2005 pesos), not including contributions from regional entities, to develop the policy for integral attention to displaced persons. It is worth noting that in 2003 and 2004 alone, the resources allocated equaled US$ 189 million (43.7%), while for the whole 1995 - 2002 period, the investment was US$ 244 million (56.3%).

The investment made in each one of the phases of attention to displaced persons breaks down into 40.4% for the emergency humanitarian assistance phase, 59.4% for the socio-
economic stabilization phase, and 0.2% for the phase for the prevention of displacement and for strengthening democratic institutions.

With the support of the United States Southern Command, the Coordination Center for Integral Action (CCAI) was created in 2004. The Center brings together various Colombian government entities that complement and support the military recovery of territory by means of social and economic programs. Through the CCAI, US$ 35 million have been invested in 52 priority municipalities and in those municipalities most affected by violence.

C. Strengthening democratic institutions

PC has also led to the long-term strengthening of democratic institutions in the country. Through help from the United States government, special human rights units have been established, an early warning system has been organized to prevent massacres or forced displacements, and legislation and standards have been created relative to money laundering and asset forfeiture. Contributions made to the justice system are also notable for their importance.

Support for the Accusatory Criminal Procedure System

Emphasis should be placed on the support provided from the beginning for the implementation of the accusatory criminal procedure system. It has now entered its second phase of implementation, covering a total of 12 judicial districts of the 29 programmed for 2008.

The main activities financed are of a diverse nature and cover multiple needs. Four specific lines of work, however, can be identified:

i. training
ii. physical and technological infrastructure
iii. Planning and management models
iv. Strengthening of criminal investigative skills.
With respect to training, initiatives have been taken such as the formation and consolidation of a body of trainers, and the development of inter-institutional work networks. There has also been support for designing training modules for judges and district attorneys in procedural techniques and criminal law.

As far as adaptation of the physical and technological structure, there has been decisive support for building courtrooms and evidence storerooms at the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation and the jurisdictional sector, as well as a push for the adaptation of the technological platform for that same office and for the National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Forensic Scientists (INMLCF for the initials in Spanish), among other initiatives.

In the area of planning and design of management models, PC led to carrying out the “Operative Plan for Implementation of Criminal Reform,” which has become a key budget programming instrument for the resources allocated for the accusatory system. In addition, the support has permitted the design and validation of a management model, through a pilot laboratory in the specialized courts of Bogotá.

Lastly, in the area of strengthening criminal investigation skills, the PC support has allowed laboratories to be updated and fundamental equipment and tools to be acquired for the work of the Technical Investigation Corp (CTI) at the Office of the District Attorney. Photographic slides, genetics, and toxicology at the INMLCF have also been updated.

Thanks to the cooperation from the government of the United States, the results of the implementation of the accusatory system include processing a significant number of cases with high social relevance. Table 6 lists the district attorney offices and judicial districts that began to function under the new system in Phase I, and some of the high-impact cases that have received the longest sentences.
Table 6. Symbolic cases in the Accusatory Criminal Procedure System Phase I (January - September 30, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>N° of People Convicted</th>
<th>Sentence (Years)</th>
<th>Duration (Days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Anti-Narcotic Unit</td>
<td>Trafficking of Narcotics</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10 - 23.6</td>
<td>25 - 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Anti-Terrorism Unit</td>
<td>Homicide and Aggravated Homicide, Illegal Carrying of Weapons, and Use of a False Document</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.5 - 22</td>
<td>21 - 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attempted Aggravated Homicide</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>19 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attempted Homicide</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.2 - 12.5</td>
<td>22 - 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>109 - 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggravated Homicide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pereira</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>109 - 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attempted Homicide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conspiracy to Commit a Crime</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manizales</td>
<td>Homicide and Illegal Carrying of Weapons</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.1 - 40.1</td>
<td>35 - 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggravated Homicide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.5 - 28.5</td>
<td>24 - 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Homicide and Attempted Homicide and Illegal Carrying of Weapons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.3 - 41</td>
<td>21 - 132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Access to Justice

The efforts to guarantee State presence and to strengthen the justice system through the creation of mechanisms for access to justice have been complemented by the Houses of Justice Program (CJ from the initials in Spanish). That program has established
the basis for coordinating the different channels of justice (formal and informal), and has provided alternatives for peaceful resolution of conflicts in communities located far from urban centers.

Thus, in the 10 years since they have been established, the CJs have made important advancements. According to information from the Ministry of the Interior and of Justice (MIJ), as of June 2005, there were 39 Houses of Justice in Colombia, distributed throughout the nation as shown on Map 1.
Map 1. Geographic distribution of the Houses of Justice

N.° House of Justice N.° House of Justice N.° House of Justice N.° House of Justice N.° House of Justice
1 Armenia 11 Cali - Siloé 21 Manizales 31 Quibdó
2 Barranquilla - Simón Bolívar 12 Cartagena - Chiquinquirá 22 Medellín 32 Rionegro
3 Barranquilla - La Paz 13 Cartagena - Country 23 Mocoa 33 San Andrés
4 Bello 14 Cartago 24 Montería 34 Santa Marta - Funcionarios
5 Bogotá - Ciudad Bolívar 15 Chía 25 Neiva 35 Soacha
6 Bogotá - Suba 16 Chigorodó 26 Pasto 36 Tuluá
7 Bucaramanga 17 Cúcuta 27 Pereira - Villa Santana 37 Valledupar
8 Buenaventura 18 Floridablanca 28 Pereira - Cuba 38 Villavicencio
9 Buga 19 Girardot 29 Popayán 39 Yopal
10 Cali - Aguablanca 20 Ibagué 30 Puerto Asís 40 Tunja

From January 2002 to March 2005, the Houses of Justice have responded to a total of 2,036,951 petitions, as reflected in Graph 18. It is important to note that while the increase in demand for services during the period from 2003 to 2004 was 42.8%, by the end of the first quarter of 2005, they had already received 30% of the total petitions in that 2003 to 2004 period, which allows us to see a sustained growth pattern.

According to the results from the first quarter of 2005, the Houses of Justice focused their activity on the following types of consultations: attention to family conflicts (33.1%), criminal problems (12.3%), and loss or absence of documents (10.1%).

Another initiative that has been supported through PC has been the creation of Citizen Coexistence Centers (CCC), headed up by the MIJ. The program aims, with the involvement of the regional authorities, to foment spaces, programs, and initiatives that will promote good citizenship and peaceful coexistence.

In the period from August 2002 to June 2005, 10 of the 14 CCC have been put in motion that were programmed for the period, representing 71% of the goal established.
Finally, PC support has helped to strengthen Alternative Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution such as equity conciliation. Since the year 2002, the Department of Access to Justice at the MIJ has been working hand-in-hand with international cooperation through USAID, regional entities, and non-governmental organizations across the country to build a sustainable public policy for equity conciliation.

The main achievement of this important synergy is the presence of the mechanism in more than 177 cities and municipalities of the country, and the naming of 2,424 equity conciliators. Table 7 summarizes the increase in conciliators approved since 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>N.° Consiliators approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIJ - Department for Access to Justice

**Investment in Local Government**

Local governments have also benefited from the bilateral cooperation, through programs and projects to increase transparency and effectiveness. Municipal and rural infrastructure works have benefited local communities and, therefore, have strengthened communities’ ties to government institutions.

The program for social infrastructure and community management helped to develop 740 social infrastructure works in 175 municipalities. Through it, more than 3.2 million Colombians have benefited from the recovery of 413 schools, 29 health posts, 198 sports facilities, and 100 centers for community development
Protection of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

Relative to the fight against impunity in cases of HR violations and IHL infractions, on March 6, 2006, the Colombian State approved a Conpes document\(^9\) that seeks to strengthen the State’s capacity for investigating, judging, and punishing these violations and infractions\(^10\). The policy, spearheaded by the Office of the Vice President of the Republic, implies a significant fiscal effort by the Nation, due to the fact that its implementation will require an investment of $40,000 million, of which the nation will contribute $22,344 million.

Progress has also been made in strengthening the institutions of the Armed Forces. Courses, seminars, and workshops on HR and Military Criminal Justice issues have been held for personnel from the Armed Forces and the National Police, with support from the cooperation and in coordination with different academic institutions. This aid includes materials and publications for dissemination, and logistical support for the participation of military and uniformed personnel in the programmed events.

International aid’s contribution is reflected in the internalization of the principles of respect for Human Rights and the complete application of Military Criminal Justice. This has led to a decrease in HR infractions by the members of the public security forces. The workshops cover topics such as the preventive function, international protection of HR, legislation on ethnic and linguistic minorities, prevention of situations of forced displacement, and the law against forced disappearance.

Specialized officers have been trained in issues such as conflict resolution, HR, IHL, and public international law.

\(^9\) Conpes document N.\(^{.}\) 3411 of 2006. Política de lucha contra la impunidad en casos de violaciones a los Derechos Humanos e infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario, a través del fortalecimiento de la capacidad del Estado Colombiano para la investigación, juzgamiento y sanción (Policy on the fight against impunity in cases of Human Rights violations and International Humanitarian Law infractions, through the strengthening of the Colombian State’s capacity for investigating, judging, and punishing). Bogotá: National Planning Department.

\(^10\) The policy was put together with the leadership of the Office of the Vice President of the Republic and with the participation of the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, the Inspector General of the Nation, the Superior Counsel of the Judicature, the Office of the Public Defender, the National Planning Department, the Ministry of the Interior and of Justice, and the Penitentiary and Prison Institute.
D. Progress in the Colombian peace process

The Colombian government, interested in restoring conditions of normality and peace, has been generating spaces for the members of the illegal armed groups to effectively re-integrate into life in society.

As a fundamental part of this policy, programs have been designed to create incentives for their re-integration into legitimate economic activity. Approaches are sought that might help to obtain peace in Colombia. These programs include alternatives for education, employment, psychosocial treatment, and legal options for employment.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Over the period from 1999 until today, both Colombia and the world have experienced substantial changes. At a conjuncture where organized crime crosses borders, and where social problems spill over despite national boundaries, international cooperation is fundamental in order to delineate strategies and channel funds to counteract these types of problems. All countries share in the responsibility for the fight against drugs and terrorism.

In this context, the success of Plan Colombia is not only of vital importance for Colombians, but for the entire international community. No nation is exempt from suffering from some of the problems associated with illegal drugs, with poverty, or with the operations of organizations that put the democratic institutions of the region at risk.

In the component for the fight against the world drug problem and organized crime, the substantial reduction of close to 50% in coca cultivations in Colombia, the strengthening of the operational capacities of the Forces, and the involvement of the international community under the principle of shared responsibility are the main achievements of the Plan.

In the economic and social arenas, Plan Colombia has served to strengthen the Colombian economy and to take it to the levels of economic growth required to
extinguish the illicit economies generated by drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. In addition, the Plan increased the levels of well being in those zones where coca leaves are most often cultivated, by providing feasible alternatives for Colombian peasants.

Lastly, the results of the Plan show how the Colombian State has increased its capacity to maintain peace in its territory and on its borders. The improvement of operational and response capabilities in the public security forces, accompanied by a stronger justice system, are the most important achievements of Plan Colombia in this component.

In general terms, the success of each one of the components of PC demonstrates that the comprehensive strategy has been effective. In addition, it leaves open the possibility of continuing with the strategy in order to consolidate its results. In that way, there will be permanent achievements in the fight against the traffic of illegal drugs, against organized crime, and against poverty, and in reweaving the social fabric in Colombia. All of these will redound in better governability, stronger democratic institutions, and a solid democracy.

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that, despite the achievements made, there are still many challenges facing Colombia in its search for a solid democracy and a country at peace. These challenges argue the need to continue with the international support as an important complement to national efforts.